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981 
SHIELDING CHILDREN FROM PORNOGRAPHY 
BY INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE CHOICE 
INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2016, Playboy stopped publishing images of naked women 
in their magazines.1 According to the company’s chief executive, Scott 
Flanders, “[the] battle has been fought and won . . . . You’re now one click 
away from every sex act imaginable for free. And so it’s just passé at this 
juncture.”2 In stark contrast to the world of past generations, “[n]ow every 
teenage boy has an Internet-connected phone . . . . Pornographic magazines, 
even those as storied as Playboy, have lost their shock value, their 
commercial value and their cultural relevance.”3 
One consequence of modern technological advancements is that online 
pornography has become both prevalent and highly accessible to children.4 
Though some children access pornography intentionally, many are exposed 
to pornography unintentionally, often at very young ages.5 Some adults are 
dismayed by this new normal, arguing that exposure to pornography and its 
inherent messages is harmful to children.6 Others argue that there is 
evidence that pornography may not be harmful after all, at least when it 
comes to its consumption by teenagers.7 Still others seem to approach the 
issue from a more neutral perspective, viewing the prevalence of online 
																																																						
1. Ravi Somaiya, Nudes Are Old News at Playboy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/media/nudes-are-old-news-at-playboy.html. 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. Ironically, Playboy changed its mind after a year and began publishing images of naked 
women again in March of 2017. Mike Snider, ‘Playboy’ Brings Nudity Back to Magazine, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 13, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://perma.cc/XZS2-F64M (“Cooper Hefner, the son of magazine founder 
Hugh Hefner, announced the move . . . saying, ‘I'll be the first to admit that the way in which the 
magazine portrayed nudity was dated, but removing it entirely was a mistake.’”). 
4.  Nick Bilton, Parenting in the Age of Online Pornography, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/style/parenting-in-the-age-of-online-porn.html; see also infra Part 
I. 
5.  Janis Wolak et al., Unwanted and Wanted Exposure to Online Pornography in a National 
Sample of Youth Internet Users, 119 PEDIATRICS 247, 247 (2007). See also infra Part I. 
6.  See, e.g., Jane Randel & Amy Sánchez, Parenting in the Digital Age of Pornography, 
HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:24 PM), https://perma.cc/RHE2-RTE8 (“It’s naive to 
assume that uninformed viewers with little sexual experience will not be influenced by these messages 
. . . . Exposure to pornography creates unrealistic expectations for both women and men when engaging 
in sex, and that could very well be a driver of sexual assault among young people.”). 
7.  See, e.g., Bilton, supra note 4 (observing that some “experts who monitor teenagers and 
sexuality say that there is plenty of evidence” that indicates the pervasiveness of online pornography 
may not be as harmful to today’s youth as some contend). “‘If you just look at the indicators of sexual 
responsibility, you don’t see a generation of kids looking like they are off the rails,’ said David Finkelhor 
. . . a director of the Family Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire. But Dr. Finkelhor 
acknowledged that the long-term psychological effects of teenagers’ access to online pornography was 
still being determined.” Id. 
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pornography as an inevitable new reality we simply need to learn how to 
live with.8 This difference in perspective raises the question of whether 
children’s easy access to online pornography is a problem we should 
address. 
Part I of this Note argues that children’s easy access to online 
pornography is indeed a problem, and it is time for Congress to revisit this 
issue. Part II provides an overview of Congress’s attempts to deal with the 
problem up to this point, most of which have been unsuccessful. Part III 
proposes that Congress pass legislation that awards financial incentives to 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Mobile Data Providers (MDP) who 
provide default filtering that adult customers can easily turn off. Part III also 
explains why passing this type of legislation is constitutionally permissible. 
Finally, Part IV argues that passing this type of legislation is normatively a 
good idea. 
I. CHILDREN’S EASY ACCESS TO ONLINE PORNOGRAPHY IS A PROBLEM 
THAT CONGRESS SHOULD REVISIT 
This Part first presents evidence that children’s exposure to pornography 
on the Internet is both prevalent and harmful. It then argues that Congress 
can and should revisit this issue and take further action to shield children 
from exposure to online pornography. 
A. The Prevalence of Exposure to Online Pornography During Childhood 
and the Harm It Causes 
The great majority of America’s youth—93 percent of boys and 62 
percent of girls—are exposed to pornography online before their eighteenth 
birthdays.9 On average, a child is first exposed to online pornography at the 
age of eleven,10 and twelve to seventeen-year-olds consume more online 
pornography than any other age group.11 Alarming percentages of children 
have seen dark, disturbing, and even illegal types of pornography online, 
including bondage, bestiality, depictions of rape or sexual violence, and 
child pornography.12 In a 2005 study, 42 percent of all youth who used the 
																																																						
8.  See, e.g., id. (“Here’s the new reality: Thanks to the Internet, children will see things that 
children probably shouldn’t.”). 
9.  WALT MUELLER, CTR. FOR PARENT/YOUTH UNDERSTANDING, A PARENTS’ PRIMER ON 
INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/HWS3-WE8N. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id.; Robert A. Gomez, Protecting Minors from Online Pornography Without Violating the 
First Amendment: Mandating an Affirmative Choice, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
12.  Mueller, supra note 9, at 4 (“39% of boys and 23% of girls have seen online sex acts 
depicting bondage . . . 32% of boys and 18% of girls have viewed bestiality on the Internet . . . 18% of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/9
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Internet had been exposed to online pornography in the previous year, and 
66 percent of those youth reported that all of their exposure had been 
unwanted.13 Vulnerable populations of youth reported higher rates of 
exposure, including those showing indications of depression, a history of 
interpersonal victimization, or tendencies towards delinquency.14 
Though more research is needed concerning the potential impact of 
exposure to pornography online,15 continued exposure can be harmful to 
children in many ways.16 “Exposure and/or easy access to adult 
pornography, X-rated media, or child pornography” is one of many risk 
factors that can make a child more vulnerable to sexual abuse.17 In addition, 
pornography often normalizes sexual harm,18 promotes aggression towards 
women,19 shapes negative attitudes and behaviors towards women,20 
diminishes the capacity to establish and maintain healthy intimate 
relationships,21 and can lead to addiction.22 Consumption of pornography by 
																																																						
boys and 10% of girls have seen depictions of rape and/or sexual violence on the Internet . . . 15% of 
boys and 9% of girls have seen child pornography”). 
13.  Wolak et al., supra note 5, at 247. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  See Allison Baxter, How Pornography Harms Children: The Advocate’s Role, 33 CHILD L. 
PRAC. 113, 113 (2014) (“Excessive media use . . . skews children’s world view, increases high-risk 
behaviors, and alters their capacity for successful and sustained human relationships . . . . Pornography 
may have stronger effects among children and youth than other forms of media because it shows a much 
higher degree of sexual explicitness.”). 
17.  Understanding What Makes Kids Vulnerable to Being Sexually Abused, STOP IT NOW!, 
https://perma.cc/8EKG-B6KF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
18.  Rachel B. Duke, ‘Epidemic’ Growth of Net Porn Cited, WASH. TIMES (June 15, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/Y58B-7H25; Baxter, supra note 16, at 113 (“[P]ornography normalizes sexual harm by 
portraying a lack of emotional relationship between consensual partners, unprotected sexual contact, 
and, in some instances, violence and rape.”). 
19.  Baxter, supra note 16, at 113 (“Pornography is arguably more sexist and hostile towards 
women than other sexual images in the media.”) (citing Michael Flood, The Harms of Pornography 
Exposure Among Children and Young People, 18 CHILD ABUSE REV. 384, 386–87 (2009)); see also 
Gert Martin Hald et al., Pornography and Attitudes Supporting Violence Against Women: Revisiting the 
Relationship in Nonexperimental Studies, 36 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 14, 14 (2010) (concluding that there 
is a “significant positive association between pornography use and attitudes supporting violence against 
women in nonexperimental studies”). 
20.  Baxter, supra note 16, at 118 (“A 2009 analysis of studies on pornography and violence 
towards women reveals a significant relationship between pornography consumption and attitudes 
supporting violence towards women.”) (citing Hald et al., supra note 19). 
21.  Baxter, supra note 16, at 118 (“Sexual socialization theory suggests frequent exposure to 
consistent themes about gender and sexual behavior can affect a young person’s developing sense of 
what is expected sexually for men and women and may also affect later behavior.”) (citing Jane D. 
Brown & Kelly L. L’Engle, X-Rated: Sexual Attitudes & Behaviors Associated with U.S. Early 
Adolescents’ Exposure to Sexually Explicit Media, 36 COMM. RES. 129, 132 (2009)). 
22.  Baxter, supra note 16, at 118. (“The medical field has recognized that pornography 
consumption can be problematic . . . . Children and teens are capable of developing compulsive sexual 
behaviors, which can lead to sexual addiction.”) (citing Jill C. Manning, The Impact of Internet 
Pornography on Marriage and the Family: A Review of the Research, 13 SEXUAL ADDICTION & 
COMPULSIVITY 131, 155 (2006)). 
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children and teenagers has been associated with viewing society through an 
oversexualized lens, normalizing sexual promiscuity, believing sexual 
abstinence is abnormal and unhealthy, choosing to engage in sexual 
intercourse at a younger age, commodifying sex, objectifying others, and 
having unrealistic and harmful expectations about sex.23 “While children 
and young people are sexual beings and deserve age-appropriate materials 
on sex and sexuality, pornography is a poor, and indeed dangerous, sex 
educator.”24 
In light of the serious risks that exposure to online pornography poses to 
children, it is unsurprising that “[t]here has been extensive worry about the 
possible harms to youth . . . expressed by the medical establishment, 
psychologists, the public, Congress, and even the [U.S.] Supreme Court.”25 
Researchers have concluded that “[t]aken together, these expressions of 
concern suggest that there is a broad consensus that youth should be 
shielded from online pornography.”26 But, as this Note discusses in more 
detail below, most legislation that Congress has passed in an attempt to 
protect children from online pornography has been struck down by the 
Supreme Court, and Congress has largely given up on addressing this 
issue.27 
B. Congress Can and Should Do More to Protect Children from Exposure 
to Online Pornography 
This need not be the end of the story in the United States. Consider 
measures taken in the United Kingdom to protect British children from 
exposure to online pornography. On July 22, 2013, former Prime Minister 
David Cameron gave a speech “to talk about the [I]nternet, the impact it’s 
having on the innocence of our children, how online pornography is 
corroding childhood and how, in the darkest corners of the [I]nternet, there 
are things going on that are a direct danger to our children and that must be 
stamped out.”28 He explained that the “growth of the [I]nternet as an 
unregulated space” posed two major challenges in protecting British 
																																																						
23.  MUELLER, supra note 9, at 5. 
24.  Flood, supra note 19, at 384. 
25.  Wolak et. al., supra note 5, at 248. 
26.  Id. See also Gomez, supra note 11, at 2 (“[T]here is a general consensus that pornography 
has a detrimental effect on impressionable youths.”). 
27.  See infra Part II. In addition to diminished Congressional efforts to legislate in this area in 
recent years, presidential candidates seem less likely than before to speak out against the proliferation 
of online pornography or in support of rigorous enforcement of federal obscenity laws. See Steven 
Nelson, GOP Candidates Won’t Promise to End Porn, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 4, 2016, 3:54 
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-02-04/gop-candidates-wont-promise-to-end-porn. 
28.  Prime Minister David Cameron, Speech to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children (July 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/2GR9-8P5P. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/9
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children, one of which was “that many children are viewing online 
pornography and other damaging material at a very early age and . . . the 
nature of that pornography is so extreme it is distorting their view of sex 
and relationships.”29 He announced that he had reached an agreement with 
British mobile phone providers, public Wi-Fi providers, and private ISPs to 
provide default filtering of adult content.30 The mobile phone operators 
agreed to equip phones with automatic adult content filters that could only 
be deactivated by individuals who could prove they were over eighteen.31 
Public Wi-Fi providers agreed that “family friendly filters [would] be 
applied across public Wi-Fi networks wherever children are likely to be 
present.”32 And private ISPs agreed to equip new accounts with 
automatically selected filters that “can only be changed by the account 
holder, who has to be an adult. So an adult has to be engaged in the 
decisions.”33 The ISPs also agreed to contact all existing customers to 
present them “with an unavoidable decision about whether or not to install 
family friendly content filters.”34 
The default filtering ultimately enacted in the United Kingdom arguably 
went too far, as the British government used the filters to block a wide 
variety of content that was not pornographic in nature.35 But, as discussed 
below, U.S. lawmakers could avoid this pitfall by narrowly tailoring the 
type of content they incentivize ISPs and MDPs to filter by default.36 With 
92 percent of American teens using the Internet daily and 24 percent 
reporting that they go online “almost constantly,”37 the landscape is 
dramatically different today than it was even a few years ago. Thus, it is 
time for Congress to take further action to protect children from exposure 
to online pornography.  
 
																																																						
29.  Id. The other challenge Cameron identified was the “criminal . . . proliferation and 
accessibility of child abuse images on the internet.” Id. He acknowledged that the two challenges were 
“very distinct and very different.” Id. “In one we’re talking about illegal material, the other is legal 
material that is being viewed by those who are underage.” Id. But he observed that “both the challenges 
have something in common; they’re about how our collective lack of action on the internet has led to 
harmful and, in some cases, truly dreadful consequences for children.” Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See Laurie Penny, David Cameron’s Internet Porn Filter is the Start of Censorship Creep, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://perma.cc/DZE6-S666. 
36.  See infra Part III. 
37.  Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 
9, 2015), https://perma.cc/Y5UU-HLJA. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS’S ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE 
PROBLEM38 
This Part details the history of Congress’s prior attempts to shield 
children from online pornography and the Supreme Court’s responses to 
those attempts. Specifically, this Part will consider the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act of 1998, and the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000. Though the Court struck down 
the first two pieces of legislation as unconstitutional, it upheld the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act. 
A. The Communications Decency Act 
Concerned about the “amount of sexually explicit materials available for 
viewing and distribution over the Internet,”39 Congress passed the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) in 1996.40 The CDA prohibited 
“knowingly” transmitting a “communication which is obscene or indecent, 
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age.”41 
It also prohibited “us[ing] an interactive computer service to send to a 
specific person or persons under 18 years of age” or “display in a manner 
available to a person under 18 years of age” any “communication that, in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs.”42 The statute provided affirmative defenses for individuals who 
“ha[d] taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions 
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a 
communication” or “ha[d] restricted access to such communication by 
requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or 
adult personal identification number.”43 
In 1997, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the 
CDA in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.44 The Court noted “the 
legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children 
																																																						
38.  See generally GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 15.02 
(2017); James F.X. Petrich, Constitutionality of Sexually Oriented Speech: Obscenity, Indecency, and 
Child Pornography, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 81 (2015). 
39.  DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, at 11. 
40.  Petrich, supra note 38, at 94. 
41.  47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1997), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). Violating this portion of the statute carried a possible penalty of a fine, imprisonment for up to 
two years, or both. § 223(a)(2). 
42.  § 223(d)(1)(A), (B). Violating this portion of the statute also carried a possible penalty of a 
fine, imprisonment for up to two years, or both. § 223(d)(2). 
43.  § 223(e)(5)(A), (B). 
44.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018] SHIELDING CHILDREN FROM PORNOGRAPHY 987 
 
 
 
from harmful materials.”45 But it nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the 
district court,46 striking down the “indecent transmission” and “patently 
offensive display” provisions47 but “expressly preserv[ing] the 
Government’s right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child 
pornography activities prohibited therein.”48 
In striking down the “patently offensive display” provision, the Court 
cited the three-part test it set forth for obscenity in Miller v. California: 
“(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”49 
The Court reasoned that because the CDA’s “patently offensive display” 
provision lacked requirements and limitations inherent in the Miller test, the 
provision presented “a greater threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls 
outside the statute’s scope.”50 The Court further reasoned that “[g]iven the 
vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences 
some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional 
protection,” a danger that “provides further reason for insisting that the 
statute not be overly broad.”51 
In striking down the “indecent transmission” provision, the Court 
acknowledged that it has “repeatedly recognized the governmental interest 
in protecting children from harmful materials.”52 But the Court also 
explained that “[i]n evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have 
made it perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not 
																																																						
45.  Id. at 849. 
46.  Id. at 885. 
47.  Id. at 859, 864. 
48.  Id. at 864. 
49.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
50.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74. 
51.  Id. at 874. 
52.  Id. at 875 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)). In Ginsberg, the Court held that “[m]aterial which is protected for distribution 
to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children,” 
explaining that “[b]ecause of the State's exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of 
objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its 
community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.” 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In Pacifica, the Court explained 
that the First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the content of 
speech in finding that the Federal Communications Commission has the power to regulate a radio 
broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744, 750–51. 
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obscene is protected by the First Amendment’”53 and asserted that the 
government’s interest in protecting children “does not justify an 
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.”54 The 
district court had found that: 1) “at the time of trial existing technology did 
not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from 
obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying 
access to adults,”55 2) there was “no effective way to determine the age of a 
user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, 
or chat rooms,”56 and 3) “it would be prohibitively expensive for 
noncommercial—as well as some commercial—speakers who have Web 
sites to verify that their users are adults.”57 Relying on those findings, the 
Court concluded that “[the CDA’s] limitations must inevitably curtail a 
significant amount of adult communication on the Internet.”58 
Notably, in reaching its conclusions the Court relied in part on findings 
by the district court that led the Court to believe that “[t]hough [sexually 
explicit] material is widely available [on the Internet], users seldom 
encounter such content accidentally.”59 That may have been true in 1997, 
but there is ample evidence that suggests it is not true today.60 
The Court also expressed concern that the CDA prohibited “indecent” 
and “patently offensive” messages communicated to teenagers even if their 
parents approved of the communication.61 As a possible alternative to the 
																																																						
53.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (quoting Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989)). 
54.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 875. 
55.  Id. at 876. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 876–77. 
58.  Id. at 877. 
59.  Id. at 854. 
“A document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before the document 
itself . . . and in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a site’s content 
before he or she need to take the step to access the document. Almost all sexually explicit 
images are preceded by warnings as to the content.” For that reason, the “odds are slim” that a 
user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident. Unlike communications received by radio 
or television, “the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps 
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication 
and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet unattended.” 
Id. (quoting findings by the district court in 929 F. Supp. 824, 844–45 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
60.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 13. 
61.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 878. 
Under the CDA, a parent allowing her 17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain 
information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a 
lengthy prison term. Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman information 
on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone 
in their home community, found the material “indecent” or “patently offensive,” if the college 
town’s community thought otherwise. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/9
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CDA provisions, the Court cited with approval a finding by the district court 
that “‘a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their 
children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents 
may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely 
available.’”62 
Today, the statute prohibits “knowingly” transmitting a “communication 
which is obscene or child pornography, knowing that the recipient of the 
communication is under 18 years of age”63 and “us[ing] an interactive 
computer service” to “send to a specific person or persons under 18 years 
of age” or “display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age” 
any “communication that is obscene or child pornography.”64 
B. The Child Online Protection Act 
In 1998, Congress “attempted to limit the access of minors to harmful 
materials” by passing the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).65 In passing 
COPA, Congress attempted “to remedy the constitutional defects of the 
CDA.”66 The statute provided that “[w]hoever knowingly and with 
knowledge of the character of the material . . . makes any communication 
for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any 
material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, 
imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.”67 According to the statute, a 
person was engaged in “commercial purposes only if such person is engaged 
in the business of making such communications.”68 Importantly, the statute 
defined the term “material that is harmful to minors” as: 
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, 
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or 
that— 
(A)  the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect 
to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the 
prurient interest; 
(B)  depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive 
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual 
																																																						
62.  Id. at 855. 
63.  47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
64.  § 223(d)(1)(A), (B). 
65.  DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.02. 
66.  Id. 
67.  47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1998), invalidated by ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, Mukasey v. ACLU, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009). 
68.  § 231(e)(2)(A). 
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contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a 
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C)  taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors.69 
The term “minor” was defined as “any person under 17 years of age.”70 
The statute exempted any person who was “a telecommunications carrier 
engaged in the provision of a telecommunications service,”71 “engaged in 
the business of providing an Internet access service,”72 “engaged in the 
business of providing an Internet information location tool,”73 or similarly 
engaged in one of these activities.74 It provided an affirmative defense for 
any defendant who:  
in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is 
harmful to minors— 
(A)  by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, 
or adult personal identification number;  
(B)  by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or  
(C)  any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology.75  
																																																						
69.  § 231(e)(6). This mixes language from the Miller obscenity test with additional restrictive 
language. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
70.  § 231(e)(7). 
71.  § 231(b)(1). 
72.  § 231(b)(2). 
73.  § 231(b)(3). 
74.  § 231(b)(4). This subpart of the statute specified that individuals 
similarly engaged in the transmission, storage, retrieval, hosting formatting or translation (or 
any combination thereof) of a communication made by another person, without selection or 
alteration of the content of the communication, except that such person’s deletion of a particular 
communication or material made by another person in a manner consistent with subsection (c) 
. . . or section 230 shall not constitute such selection or alteration of the content of the 
communication. 
Id. 
 
75.  § 231(c)(1). Successful assertion of an affirmative defense also barred civil liability under 
the statute. § 231(c)(2). 
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In addition to the criminal penalty, it provided for a civil penalty for 
violations76 and tacked on additional criminal penalties for anyone who 
“intentionally violate[d]” the statute.77 
The constitutionality of COPA was litigated for ten years.78 Finally, in 
2009, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Mukasey,79 a 2008 Third Circuit case that struck down 
COPA, effectively ensuring that COPA would never go into effect.80 In 
Mukasey, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusions that 
“COPA is not narrowly tailored to advance the Government’s compelling 
interest in protecting children from harmful material,” “there are less 
restrictive, equally effective alternatives to COPA,” and “COPA is 
impermissibly overbroad and vague.”81 The court first observed that 
“COPA criminalizes a category of speech—‘harmful to minors’ material—
that is constitutionally protected for adults,” explaining that “[b]ecause 
COPA is a content-based restriction on protected speech, it is presumptively 
invalid and the Government bears the burden of showing its 
constitutionality.”82 The court further explained that “[t]o survive strict 
scrutiny analysis, a statute must: (1) serve a compelling governmental 
interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) be the least 
restrictive means of advancing that interest.”83 The court acknowledged 
Congress’s “compelling interest in protecting the physical and 
																																																						
76.  § 231(a)(3). “In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (2), whoever violates 
paragraph (1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes 
of this paragraph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.” Id. 
77.  § 231(a)(2). “In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever intentionally violates 
such paragraph shall be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of 
this paragraph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.” Id. 
78.  COPA would have taken effect on November 29, 1998, but in October of 1998, a group of 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of COPA, and the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction. Id.; ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). This decision was affirmed by the 
Third Circuit in 2000. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court vacated the 
Third Circuit’s decision that same year, holding that “the Third Circuit erred in holding that COPA 
violated the First Amendment by relying on contemporary community standards to identify material that 
is harmful to minors.” DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.02 (discussing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 
U.S. 564 (2002)). On remand, the Third Circuit struck COPA down again on different grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003). On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held “that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting [a] preliminary injunction” 
preventing the enforcement of COPA. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). It allowed the 
injunction to “stand pending a full trial on the merits” of COPA. Id. at 671. On remand, the district court 
struck COPA down yet again and issued a permanent injunction to prevent the government from 
enforcing it. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007). On appeal a year later, the Third 
Circuit struck down COPA itself, and, in 2009, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Third Circuit’s 
decision. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009). 
79.  534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009). 
80.  DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.02. 
81.  Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 184. 
82.  Id. at 187. 
83.  Id. at 190. 
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psychological well-being of minors,” as held by the Supreme Court, and 
noted that in this case, “the parties agree that the Government has a 
compelling interest to protect minors from exposure to harmful material on 
the Web.”84 But after reviewing findings by the district court regarding 
“Internet content filters,”85 the court agreed “that filters and the 
Government’s promotion of filters are more effective than COPA”86 and 
“that filters are less restrictive than COPA.”87 The court ultimately 
concluded that “the Government has not shown that COPA is a more 
effective and less restrictive alternative to the use of filters and the 
Government’s promotion of them in effectuating COPA’s purposes.”88 
In striking down COPA the court quoted the Supreme Court’s assertion 
that “Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters.”89 The 
court further reasoned that “the circumstance that some parents choose not 
to use filters does not mean that filters are not an effective alternative to 
COPA”90 and observed that “[u]nlike COPA, filters permit adults to 
determine if and when they want to use them and do not subject speakers to 
criminal or civil penalties.”91 
C. The Children’s Internet Protection Act 
In 2000, though COPA’s ultimate fate in the courts had yet to be decided, 
Congress took further action to protect children from obscene and 
pornographic images by passing the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
																																																						
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 198. 
86.  Id. at 202. 
Given the vast quantity of speech that COPA does not cover but that filters do cover, it is 
apparent that filters are more effective in advancing Congress’s interest . . . . Moreover, filters 
are more flexible than COPA because parents can tailor them to their own values and needs 
and to the age and maturity of their children and thus use an appropriate flexible approach 
different from COPA’s “one size fits all” approach. Finally, the evidence makes clear that, 
although not flawless, with proper use filters are highly effective in preventing minors from 
accessing sexually explicit material on the Web. 
Id. at 203. 
87.  Id. at 203–04. 
Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the 
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults without 
children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to identify 
themselves or provide their credit card information. Even adults with children may obtain 
access to the same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their home 
computers. Above all, promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category 
of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished. 
Id. at 203–04 (quoting Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667). 
88.  Id. at 204. The court also found that COPA was too vague and overbroad. Id. at 207. 
89.  Id. at 202 (quoting Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 669). 
90.  Id. at 203. 
91.  Id. at 204. 
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(CIPA), a statute that required schools and libraries funded by the federal 
E-rate program92 to enforce a “policy of Internet safety.”93 The statute 
provides that a library may not use E-rate funds to purchase Internet service 
or computers used for Internet access unless the library 1) “operat[es] . . . a 
technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with 
Internet access that protects against access through such computers to visual 
depictions that are . . . ” “obscene,” “child pornography,” or “harmful to 
minors,” and 2) “is enforcing the operation of such technology protection 
measure during any use of such computers by minors.”94 CIPA defines as 
“harmful to minors”: 
any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction 
that— 
(i)  taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a 
prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; 
(ii)  depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way 
with respect to what is suitable for minors, and actual or simulated 
sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted 
sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value as to minors.95 
The term “minor” is defined as “an individual who has not attained the age 
of 17.”96 The statute permits “[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other 
authority [to] disable a technology protection measure . . . to enable access 
for bona fide research or other lawful purposes.”97 
The American Library Association and the American Civil Liberties 
Union challenged the constitutionality of CIPA in 2001,98 and the Supreme 
Court upheld the statute in 2003 in United States v. American Library 
Association,99 reversing a district court that found CIPA “facially invalid on 
																																																						
92.  “[T]he E-rate program established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles 
qualifying libraries to buy Internet access at a discount.” United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 
194, 198 (2003) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (1996)). 
93.  20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
94.  § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The statute also requires libraries to “enforce the operation of such 
technology protection measure during any use of [library] computers” with respect to “visual depictions” 
that are either “obscene” or “child pornography.” § 9134(f)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
95.  § 9134(f)(7)(B). This is similar, but not identical to, the test used in COPA. See supra note 
69 and accompanying text. 
96.  § 9134(f)(7)(C). 
97.  § 9134(f)(3). 
98.  DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.04. 
99.  539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
994 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 95:981 
	
	
 
the ground that [it] induce[s] public libraries to violate patrons’ First 
Amendment rights.”100 
Six justices voted to uphold CIPA.101 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for a plurality, rejected the district court’s holding that “the filtering 
software contemplated by CIPA was a content-based restriction on access 
to a public forum, and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny,” holding 
instead that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor 
a ‘designated’ public forum.”102 Considering the “tendency of filtering 
software to ‘overblock’” and “[a]ssuming that such erroneous blocking 
presents constitutional difficulties,” the plurality reasoned that “any such 
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have the filtering 
software disabled.”103 The plurality ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause 
public libraries’ use of Internet filtering software does not violate their 
patrons’ First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate 
the Constitution, and is a valid exercise of Congress’[s] spending power. 
Nor does CIPA impose an unconstitutional condition on public libraries.”104 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy argued that “[i]f, on the 
request of an adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable 
the Internet software filter without significant delay, there is little to this 
case.”105 He reasoned that “[i]f some libraries do not have the capacity to 
unblock specific Web sites or to disable the filter . . . that would be the 
subject for an as-applied challenge, not the facial challenge made in this 
case.”106 He emphasized that “[t]he interest in protecting young library users 
from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even compelling, 
as all Members of the Court appear to agree,” ultimately concluding that 
“[g]iven this interest, and the failure to show that the ability of adult library 
users to have access to the material is burdened in any significant degree, 
the statute is not unconstitutional on its face.”107 
																																																						
100.  Id. at 199. 
101.  Id. at 198, 214–15. 
102.  Id. at 202–03, 205. 
First, this resource—which did not exist until quite recently—has not “immemorially been held 
in trust for the use of the public and . . . been used for purposes of assembly, communication of 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions . . . The doctrines surrounding 
traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where such history is lacking. Nor 
does Internet access in a public library satisfy our definition of a “designated public forum.” 
To create such a forum, the government must make an affirmative choice to open up its property 
for use as a public forum. 
Id. at 205–06 (citations omitted). 
103.  Id. at 208–09. “When a patron encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to 
unblock it or (at least in the case of adults) disable the filter.” Id. at 209. 
104.  Id. at 214. 
105.  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
106.  Id. at 215. 
107. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Also concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer advocated for a middle-
ground approach, explaining that “[i]n ascertaining whether the statutory 
provisions are constitutional, [he] would apply a form of heightened 
scrutiny, examining the statutory requirements in question with special 
care.”108 He argued that CIPA passes this test, reasoning that CIPA’s 
objectives are “‘legitimate’ and indeed often ‘compelling,’” that “no one 
has presented any clearly superior or better fitting alternatives” to filtering 
technology, and that CIPA “contains an important exception that limits the 
speech-related harm that ‘overblocking’ might cause” because it “allows 
libraries to permit any adult patron access to an ‘overblocked’ Web site.”109 
Breyer noted that CIPA “does impose upon the patron the burden of making 
[a] request,” but he reasoned that this burden was no greater than that 
imposed by other “traditional library practices associated with segregating 
library materials.”110 
Justice Souter’s dissent—joined by Justice Ginsburg—asserted there 
was “no doubt about the legitimacy of governmental efforts to put a barrier 
between child patrons of public libraries and the raw offerings on the 
Internet otherwise available to them there.”111 Souter’s concerns with CIPA 
were twofold, and he explained that he would uphold it “if the only First 
Amendment interests raised here were those of children” or if he agreed that 
“an adult library patron could, consistently with [CIPA], obtain an 
unblocked terminal simply for the asking.”112 But he argued that “the 
unblocking provisions simply cannot be construed, even for constitutional 
avoidance purposes, to say that a library must unblock upon adult request, 
no conditions imposed and no questions asked.”113 Thus, Souter argued, the 
Court has to “take the statute on the understanding that adults will be denied 
access to a substantial amount of nonobscene material harmful to children 
but lawful for adult examination, and a substantial quantity of text and 
pictures harmful to no one.”114 Therefore, though CIPA was upheld by a 
																																																						
108.  Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
[W]e should not examine the statute’s constitutionality as if it raised no special First 
Amendment concern . . . [n]or should we accept the Government’s suggestion that a 
presumption in favor of the statute’s constitutionality applies. At the same time, in my view, 
the First Amendment does not here demand application of the most limiting constitutional 
approach—that of “strict scrutiny.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
109.  Id. at 218–19. “[T]he adult patron need only ask a librarian to unblock the specific Web site 
or, alternatively, ask the librarian, ‘Please disable the entire filter.’” Id. at 219. 
110.  Id. at 219. As examples, Breyer mentioned “closed stacks” and “interlibrary lending 
practices that require patrons to make requests that are not anonymous and to wait while the librarian 
obtains the desired materials from elsewhere . . . .” Id. 
111.  Id. at 231–32 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
112.  Id. at 232. 
113.  Id. at 233. 
114.  Id. at 233–34. 
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majority of six justices, it is reasonable to assume that had CIPA more 
clearly articulated a requirement that the library’s filtering be turned off at 
an adult patron’s request, at least eight justices would have voted to uphold 
it. 
Despite its CIPA victory in 2003, Congress has made little effort since 
to further protect children from exposure to online pornography.115 
III. INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE CHOICE AND WHY IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PERMISSIBLE 
This Part proposes that Congress pass new legislation that awards 
financial incentives to ISPs and MDPs who provide default filtering that 
their adult customers can easily opt out of. It also explains why this proposal 
is constitutionally permissible. 
Although modern filtering technology is capable of filtering numerous 
categories of unwanted content,116 this new legislation should be narrowly 
tailored to address the specific problem of children’s easy access to online 
pornography.117 This could be achieved by using the same content 
categories as CIPA118 to define the type of default filtering that ISPs and 
MDPs must provide to comply with the statute and receive its financial 
benefits. The filtering technology should notify the user any time a page or 
website is blocked,119 and compliant ISPs and MDPs should be required, at 
minimum, to offer an obvious, easy, and instant method for adult customers 
to opt out of the filtering, either permanently or temporarily.120 In addition, 
																																																						
115.  See Gomez, supra note 11, at 3. Congress passed the Truth in Domain Names Act (TDNA) 
in 2006, which makes it illegal to “knowingly use[] a misleading domain name on the Internet to deceive 
a person into viewing material constituting obscenity” or “to deceive a minor into viewing material that 
is harmful to minors.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252B(a)–(b) (2006). While this law is a “step[] in the right direction” 
that “may keep children from accessing pornography accidentally by misspelling a domain name,” it 
“does not keep them from stumbling upon links of inappropriate material while searching innocent 
terms” or “address the issue of minors who intentionally seek Internet pornography or children who 
access harmful material on sites with quite accurate domain names.” Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the 
Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1425 (2007). 
116.  See, e.g., Renee Shipley, The Best Internet Filter Software: Safeguard Your Child’s Safety 
Online, TOPTENREVIEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/2448-7ZRG (“With [Internet filtering] 
software, you can block certain websites, allow access to a select few or any combination thereof. You 
can also choose to block websites that have been flagged for certain content, such as drugs, alcohol, 
pornography or violence.”). 
117.  See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
118.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
119.  See DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.04 (arguing that “filtering software [that] 
blocks access to certain sites without informing you that this has been done . . . has the potential to 
become one of the most effective tools of global censorship” because “users cannot complain if they do 
not know that censorship is even occurring”). 
120.  More ideally, the filtering technology could offer adult customers the option to choose 
different filtering settings for different devices or users. See Shipley, supra note 116 (“Internet filter 
software works by giving you the ability to create specific user IDs for every member of your family 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/9
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ISPs and MDPs should establish a transparent process by which both 
individual customers and website owners can petition companies to 
“whitelist” specific pages or websites.121 
In contrast to proposals involving the establishment of an Internet rating 
system122 or port zoning,123 this proposal calls for filtering technology that 
would automatically filter content regardless of where a website is hosted.124 
And in contrast to proposals involving device-level filtering software,125 this 
proposal calls for filtering at the ISP or MDP level.126 The legislation could 
award financial incentives to compliant ISPs and MDPs via tax breaks, tax 
credits, or even tax penalties assessed against non-compliant ISPs and 
MDPs.127 
																																																						
who uses a computer. This enables you to set restrictions for certain individuals based on their age or 
maturity level.”). 
121.  See Shipley, supra note 116. A company can “whitelist” a page or website to ensure it is not 
blocked by the company’s filters. This remedy is intended to provide recourse to customers or website 
owners who feel that certain pages or websites have fallen victim to overblocking. Though beyond the 
scope of this Note, advocates for the LGBTQ community have argued that filtering technology often 
blocks teenagers’ access to valuable information. See generally Jacob Colling, Approaching LGBTQ 
Students’ Ability to Access LGBTQ Websites in Public Schools from a First Amendment and Public 
Policy Perspective, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347 (2013); Parents, Families, & Friends of Lesbians 
& Gays, Inc. v. Camdenton R-III Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 2d 888 (W.D. Mo. 2012). 
122.  See, e.g., DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.04 (“A group of Internet industry leaders 
have agreed to write software that is compatible with the Platform for Internet Content Selection,” which 
“creates a common format for labeling Internet content. Thus, in the future, it may be possible to have 
content rated as it is in motion pictures and on broadcast television.”). 
123.  See, e.g., Preston, supra note 115, at 1426–34 (advocating for passage of the proposed 
Internet Ports Concept Act, which would have required online content to be “zoned into different ports,” 
allowing ISPs to offer customers “Internet service limited to those ports that are subject to regulation of 
pornographic content, or ‘Community Ports’”). 
124.  Constitutional issues aside, a weakness inherent in mandatory Internet rating systems or 
zoning requirements is that enforcement is only possible for websites hosted in areas subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction. See Preston, supra note 115, at 1457 (admitting that the proposed Internet Ports Concept 
Act “regulates pornography originating in the United States” and arguing, in 2007, that “most 
pornography available on the Internet is posted from locations subject to U.S. jurisdiction”). Filtering 
technology, however, filters content regardless of its origin—an important feature given the increasingly 
global nature of the modern Internet. See Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 791–92 (“The geographic origin 
of a Web page is not a factor in how a filter works because the filter analyzes the content of the Web 
page, not the location from which it came.”). 
125.  See Gomez, supra note 11, at 19 (arguing that “Congress should pass a law requiring all new 
computers to come with pre-installed blocking and filtering software”). 
126.  The basic technology for this type of filtering already exists. See Internet Filtering (Family 
Safety), CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://perma.cc/KC8T-ZVEG (“Some 
[ISPs] will offer filtering as part of their service . . . there is usually nothing to configure—you simply 
turn this service on with your ISP, and it filters all content.”) (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). One marked 
advantage of ISP or MDP-level filtering over device-level filtering is that anyone (including a minor) 
can purchase a device, but ISPs and MDPs can require account holders to be adults. Thus, ISP or MDP-
level filtering would enable compliant companies to make sure that an adult is involved in any decision 
to opt-out of default filtering. Cf. supra text accompanying note 33. 
127.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573 (2012) (upholding the 
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act by characterizing the penalty imposed for failing to 
purchase health insurance as a tax). 
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This proposal is designed to promote a compelling government interest, 
as recognized in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,128 American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Mukasey,129 and by all nine justices in United States v. 
American Library Association.130 In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly 
asserted that “Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of 
filters,”131 and when Congress did so by passing CIPA, the Court held that 
this action was constitutional.132 
In promoting this compelling government interest, the proposed 
legislation avoids the constitutional pitfalls of the CDA and COPA and is a 
natural extension of CIPA. Because they were content-based restrictions,133 
the CDA and COPA were subject to strict scrutiny134 and faced a difficult 
hurdle in passing constitutional muster.135 In contrast, the proposed 
legislation is simply a financial incentive offered to voluntarily compliant 
ISPs and MDPs—similar to that offered to libraries and schools by CIPA.136 
And like CIPA’s provisions that allow filtering to be disabled upon request 
from an adult,137 the proposed legislation would require compliant ISPs and 
MDPs to offer an obvious, easy, and instant method for adult customers to 
																																																						
128.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
129.  See supra text accompanying note 84. 
130.  See supra text accompanying note 107. Justice Stevens, the ninth justice, also recognized 
the compelling government interest in his dissent, but he argued that because of the limits of the filtering 
technology available at the time, “local decisions tailored to local circumstances are more appropriate 
than a mandate from Congress” in protecting minor library patrons from exposure to obscenity, child 
pornography, and other harmful material. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 223 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
131.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2002). 
132.  See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
133.  Gomez, supra note 11, at 15 (“The CDA and COPA represent one school of thought on how 
to prevent children from accessing online pornography: content-based restrictions with criminal and 
civil sanctions for violators.”). 
134.  Id. (“As a result of their status as content-based restrictions, both statutes were subject to the 
highest standard of review, strict scrutiny.”). 
135.  Id. at 5 (“Congress has generally been incapable of persuading courts to uphold content-
based restrictions.”); Id. at 15 (“The fate of [the CDA and COPA] demonstrates that strict scrutiny is a 
very difficult standard to satisfy.”). 
136.  See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. The voluntary nature of compliance with the 
proposed legislation is significant. This would be a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause, as CIPA was: 
[U]nder our well-established Spending Clause precedent…we must ask whether the condition 
that Congress requires “would…be unconstitutional” if performed by the library itself. CIPA 
does not directly regulate private conduct; rather, Congress has exercised its Spending Power 
by specifying conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Therefore, Dole provides the 
appropriate framework for assessing CIPA’s constitutionality. 
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 n.2 (2003) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 210 (1987)). See also id. at 212 (“CIPA does not ‘penalize’ libraries that choose not to install 
such software, or deny them the right to provide their patrons with unfiltered Internet access. Rather, 
CIPA simply reflects Congress’[s] decision not to subsidize their doing so.”). 
137.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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disable the filtering.138 In fact, the proposed legislation would impose even 
less of a burden on adults who wish to disable filtering than CIPA does, 
because adults could autonomously disable the filtering in the privacy of 
their homes rather than having to ask a librarian to disable it for them. And 
the proposed legislation places discretion squarely in the hands of parents 
as to whether and when they choose to disable the filtering on behalf of their 
minor children.139 
Like CIPA, the legislation this Note proposes is constitutionally 
permissible. The next Part will argue that it is normatively a good idea. 
IV. INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE CHOICE IS NORMATIVELY A GOOD IDEA 
As previously mentioned, researchers have observed that there is broad 
consensus among Americans that children’s easy access to online 
pornography is a problem.140 Passing legislation to protect children from 
this exposure is consistent with our societal values as expressed by our laws. 
We have federal laws against obscenity and child pornography.141 The 
Supreme Court has held that obscene speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment,142 that states may pass laws restricting minors’ access to 
“indecent speech,”143 and that Congress may exercise its power under the 
Spending Clause to encourage the use of filters that block obscenity, child 
pornography, and material that is harmful to minors.144 Congress has passed 
legislation that promotes and protects private blocking and screening of 
offensive material: 
Policy. It is the policy of the United States— 
. . . to encourage the development of technologies which maximize 
user control over what information is received by individuals, 
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive 
computer services; 
. . . to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict 
																																																						
138.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. “[F]ilters that depend upon user involvement in 
private homes do not upset the First Amendment. Filters, unlike content-based restrictions, ‘impose 
selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.’” Gomez, 
supra note 11, at 20 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004)). 
139.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 90–91. 
140.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
141.  See, e.g., supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
142.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957). 
143.  See cases cited supra note 52. “Indecent speech” is speech that is considered harmful to 
minors but is protected for adults. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1978). 
144.  See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text; supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material; 
. . . No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected . . . .145 
And again, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the 
government has a compelling interest in shielding children from 
online pornography.146 
Filtering technology has improved over time147 and will continue to 
improve.148 Some major, private U.S. companies, including Starbucks and 
McDonald’s, have already agreed to use filtering technology on their WiFi 
networks to block pornography.149 Incentivizing ISPs and MDPs to increase 
their participation in the market for filtering technology is likely to increase 
the demand for this technology and contribute to its continued improvement 
and innovation. In addition, the value of empowering parents to make 
parenting decisions is broadly recognized.150 By putting the choice to opt 
out of default filtering in the hands of adult Internet service and mobile data 
customers, the proposed legislation does just that.151 And building the cost 
of filtering technology into the cost of Internet or mobile data service would 
enable more parents to take advantage of it.152 
																																																						
145.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(3), (b)(4)–(c), (c)(2), (c)(2)(A) (2012). 
146.  See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 84; supra 
text accompanying note 107. 
147.  See generally Shipley, supra note 116 (discussing features of modern filtering technology). 
148.  See, e.g., DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 38, § 15.04 (“Undoubtedly, in the years to come, 
filtering software is bound to become more sophisticated, and in the future, one could legitimately expect 
filtering software to solve many of the problems presently posed by unwanted exposure to sexually 
offensive materials.”). 
149.  Tobias Salinger, Starbucks and McDonald’s to Block Pornography from Wi-Fi Networks, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 15, 2016, 6:32 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/starbucks-
mcdonald-block-pornography-wi-fi-networks-article-1.2713372. 
150.  See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I Want my Kids to Watch Pornography?: Protecting 
Children from “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671, 673 (2003) (observing that the 
government’s “interest in supporting and facilitating parental supervision over their children’s access to 
sexually explicit speech” is “quite uncontroversial”). See also supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 
90–91. 
151.  See Gomez, supra note 11, at 19 (observing that “a significant number of parents are not 
aware or knowledgeable about the existence and benefits of filters”). 
152.  Net Nanny filtering software costs between $39.99 and $119.99 per year, depending on how 
many devices a customer needs filtering for. NET NANNY, https://perma.cc/5YMN-9GGV (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2017). Qustodio costs $54.95 per year for up to five devices. Qustodio, https://perma.cc/NQ7T-
HWQQ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
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Finally, there is added value in allowing adult customers to easily opt out 
of default filtering rather than encouraging them to opt in to optional 
filtering. Despite the prevalence of online pornography and the harm it 
causes,153 many children still have unfiltered Internet access at home.154 
Some parents make a conscious choice not to filter their children’s Internet 
access,155 and under the proposed legislation those parents could easily opt 
out of the default filtering. But some parents who do not want their children 
exposed to online pornography may simply have failed to obtain filtering 
technology for their homes, either out of ignorance or out of a failure to 
overcome the “inertia” of inaction.156 These parents would likely embrace 
filtering technology made available to them by the proposed legislation, 
particularly because it would require no affirmative action to set the filtering 
up.157 In the same vein, companies who have not yet begun to filter the WiFi 
they make available to their customers may be more likely to embrace 
default filtering than they are to take affirmative action to purchase and 
install filtering technology.158 Thus, the proposed legislation is likely to 
provide at least some protection from exposure to pornography to many 
																																																						
153.  See discussion supra Part I. 
154.  See, e.g., Martin Daubney, Experiment that Convinced Me Online Porn Is the Most 
Pernicious Threat Facing Children Today, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:24 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2432591/Porn-pernicious-threat-facing-children-today-By-
ex-lads-mag-editor-MARTIN-DAUBNEY.html (“When I asked the children if there were parental 
controls on the [I]nternet at home, they all said no, their parents trusted them. They all admitted their 
parents had no idea what they were watching, and would be shocked if they did know.”). 
155.  Bhagwat, supra note 150, at 701–02. 
156.  Id. at 700. 
157.  Cf. id. (noting that “imposing regulatory requirements which make it easier and less costly 
for parents to control their children’s access to sexual materials” could “help[] parents overcome their 
inertia by reducing the transactions costs of supervising their children”). 
158.  These arguments are supported by behavioral law and economics principles: 
Libertarian paternalism, a phrase coined by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, refers to a 
central component of behavioral law and economics (BLE) – the idea that good government 
should make it easier to make good decisions. Rather than overriding free will, choice 
architecture and public policy should “nudge” individuals toward decisions they would like to 
make but are unlikely to choose because they act like fallible humans instead of rational 
“Econs.” A nudge is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.” 
. . . Americans out to embrace BLE insights to reduce pornography consumption in the United 
States because such methods meet the required burden of “asymmetric paternalism.” 
Asymmetrically paternalistic regulations “create[] large benefits for those who make errors, 
while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.” 
Alexandra Harrison, Note, Nudge, Don’t Thrust: The Application of Behavioral Law and 
Economics to America’s Porn Addiction, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 337, 338–40 (2015) (citing 
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5–6 (Penguin Books 2009) (2008)); Colin Camerer et al., 
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211–14 (2003)). 
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children who would otherwise retain completely unfiltered access to an 
almost infinite supply of pornography online.159 
CONCLUSION 
Incentivizing private choice is not a perfect solution to the problem. If 
the proposed legislation is passed, some individuals and companies will opt 
out of the default filtering—giving the children who use their networks the 
same unfiltered access to online pornography that those children have today. 
And though filtering technology has improved over time and will likely 
continue to do so,160 it will never achieve perfection. Protecting children 
from exposure to online pornography requires more from adults than any 
law can accomplish.161 But given what is at stake, lawmakers can and should 
do something more than today’s status quo. Passing the proposed legislation 
would be a good place to start. 
Karen Hinkley* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
159.  Though beyond the scope of this Note, many argue that pornography consumption is harmful 
for adults as well. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 158, at 348–61. Thus, a secondary benefit of the 
proposed legislation could be aiding adults who desire to stop using pornography but have found it 
difficult to do so. See id. at 341 (“[H]elping people who wish to avoid pornography do so results in net 
gains for the populace.”). 
160.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
161.  Parents who educate and maintain an open line of communication with their children can 
reduce the harms of pornography. See, e.g., Steven Schlozman, How to Talk to Your Kids About Internet 
Pornography, CLAY CTR. OF YOUNG HEALTHY MINDS (Feb. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/8RPA-8H38. 
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